Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/242002 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economic Inquiry [ISSN:] 1465-7295 [Volume:] 59 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [Place:] Boston, USA [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 904-924
Publisher: 
Wiley Periodicals, Inc., Boston, USA
Abstract: 
In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non-cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four-player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k < n, the selected equilibria clearly differ from experimental behavior. We interpret our observations by suggesting the concept Behavioral Equilibrium Selection.
Subjects: 
equilibrium selection
experiments
global games
payoff dominance
quantal response equilibria
risk dominance
Stag Hunt games
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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