Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/24176 
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dc.contributor.authorVanberg, Margit A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:49:37Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:49:37Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24176-
dc.description.abstractThe majority of industrial organizations literature on network externalities looks at firm behaviorunder given market characteristics. The present paper instead asks the question whether thepresence of network externalities can change market characteristics, specifically, whether aninitially large market player can decline cooperation (interconnection) with competing networkoperators and thereby gain a dominant position when network externalities are significant. Thepaper comes to the conclusion that only when a network operator already has network specificmarket power due to the ownership of a monopolistic bottleneck network area, will networkexternalities enable the operator to increase his market dominance. In competitive markets or incontestable natural monopolies, however, network externalities will not lend network specificmarket power to an initially large operator. In these markets, the market process can be expected tosolve the trade-off between ensuring cooperation between competing operators and at the sametime safeguarding competition in product characteristics and quality of service.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-80en
dc.subject.jelL43en
dc.subject.jelL15en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnetwork externalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordinterconnectionen
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen
dc.subject.stwStruktur-Performance-Modellen
dc.subject.stwIndustrieökonomiken
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbstheorieen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenskooperationen
dc.subject.stwNormungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleNetwork Externalities and Interconnection Incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn504688626en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4563en

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