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dc.contributor.authorTykvová, Terezaen
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:49:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:49:34Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24170-
dc.description.abstractSyndication, which is a joint realization of one project/oneinvestment by several capital providers, is a long existing phenomenonthat plays a central role in many financial market segments. Withinthis paper we develop a theoretical model focusing on the dynamicaspect of syndication, namely the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysischecks whether repeated relationships and, thus, reputational concernsoutweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract.Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals.The second focuses on who chooses whom. We show that experiencedfinanciers may partner with either other experienced investors (in order to raise the success probability of a project) or with unskilledinvestors (who can gain knowledge). We further demonstrate thatsometimes the syndication is impeded because the financier believesthat his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract(hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-74en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSyndicationen
dc.subject.keywordHold-upen
dc.subject.keywordReputationen
dc.subject.keywordLearningen
dc.subject.stwProjektfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenskooperationen
dc.subject.stwWissenstransferen
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleWho Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn502876689en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4557en

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