Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/24170
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dc.contributor.authorTykvová, Terezaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T14:49:34Z-
dc.date.available2009-02-16T14:49:34Z-
dc.date.issued2005en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/24170-
dc.description.abstractSyndication, which is a joint realization of one project/oneinvestment by several capital providers, is a long existing phenomenonthat plays a central role in many financial market segments. Withinthis paper we develop a theoretical model focusing on the dynamicaspect of syndication, namely the know-how transfer between syndication partners and their ability to learn. The core of the analysischecks whether repeated relationships and, thus, reputational concernsoutweigh the temptation to renege on a given contract.Throughout the paper, we investigate two key topics. The first consists of the conditions under which investors syndicate their deals.The second focuses on who chooses whom. We show that experiencedfinanciers may partner with either other experienced investors (in order to raise the success probability of a project) or with unskilledinvestors (who can gain knowledge). We further demonstrate thatsometimes the syndication is impeded because the financier believesthat his partner has strong incentives to either renege on a contract(hold-up problem) or to shirk (moral hazard problem).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x05-74en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSyndicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordHold-upen_US
dc.subject.keywordReputationen_US
dc.subject.keywordLearningen_US
dc.subject.stwProjektfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwInvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmenskooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwWissenstransferen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen_US
dc.subject.stwSunk Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWho Chooses Whom? Syndication, Skills and Reputationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn502876689en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:4557-

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