Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240955 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Public Economic Theory [ISSN:] 1467-9779 [Volume:] 22 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 1313-1337
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes firm incentives to diffuse and adopt advanced abatement technology for three different regimes of tradeable emission permits (auctioning, benchmarking, and grandfathering). We particularly consider technical change that decreases marginal abatement costs (MACs) only at high emission levels, whereas it increases them at low firm emissions. We establish that the desirability of the different regimes of allocating permits to firms is critically influenced by how MACs are changed by technological improvements.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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