Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240927 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Information Systems Research [ISSN:] 1526-5536 [Issue:] Ahead of Print [Publisher:] The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences [Place:] Catonsville, MD [Year:] 2021
Verlag: 
The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences, Catonsville, MD
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate whether revenue-maximizing auctioneers selling heterogeneous items will allow for combinatorial bidding in the presence of auctioneer competition. We compare the choice of auction format by two competing auctioneers with that of a single auctioneer. Bidders are heterogeneous in their demands, with some having synergies for items. We find that, even if a single auctioneer offers a combinatorial auction, competing auctioneers in a comparable setting will not. Instead, the competing auctioneers will segment the market by restricting allowable package bids in order to increase competition between bidders. This shows that it might not be advantageous for an online market platform to offer combinatorial auctions as a design option to competing auctioneers.
Schlagwörter: 
Competing auctioneers
Combinatorial auction
Electronic marketplace
VCG mechanism
JEL: 
D44
C72
D82
DOI der veröffentlichten Version: 
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)
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