Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240773 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Texto para Discussão No. 2578
Verlag: 
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brasília
Zusammenfassung (übersetzt): 
This study investigates the relationship between electoral donations made by industrial entrepreneurs and the behavior of federal deputies elected for the 54th legislature (2011-2015), with regard to the presentation of legislative proposals favorable or contrary to the interests of that business sector. The effect of campaign financing is controlled by the effect of a number of other variables potentially relevant to the phenomenon of interest. The results show that industrial electoral contributions favor the presentation of bills that converge with the interests of the donors, but do not prevent the presentation of other bills rejected by that economic sector.
Schlagwörter: 
campaign financing
legislative behavior
Chamber of Deputies
JEL: 
D72
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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