Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240469 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1326
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Boards hire and fire CEOs based on imperfect information. Using comprehensive data on 28 cohorts in Sweden, we analyze the role of a potentially important attribute—CEO health—in corporate governance. Boards hire CEOs who are healthier than other high-skill professionals, in particular in mental health. After hiring, CEOs' health develops similarly to a control group of executives. Health predicts turnover, measured at appointment and during tenure. These results are consistent with boards appointing CEOs with health robust enough to withstand the pressures of the job, correcting mismatches occurring at the time of appointment, and responding expediently to health shocks.
Schlagwörter: 
CEOs
Corporate Governance
Executives
Mental Health
Physical Health
JEL: 
G34
I12
J24
J31
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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