Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240405 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Working Paper No. 2019/19
Publisher: 
University of Basel, Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), Basel
Abstract: 
The enfranchisement of foreigners is likely one of the most controversial frontiers of institutional change in developed democracies, which are experiencing an increasing number of non-citizen residents. We study the conditions under which citizens are willing to share power. To this end, we exploit the unique setting of the Swiss canton of Grisons, where municipalities are free to decide on the introduction of non-citizen voting rights at the local level (a so called opting-in regime). Consistent with the power dilution hypothesis, we find that enfranchisement is less likely the larger the share of resident foreigners. Moreover, municipalities with a large language/cultural minority are less likely to formally involve foreigners. In contrast, municipality mergers seem to act as an institutional catalyst, promoting democratic reforms. A supplementary panel analysis on electoral support for an opting-in regime in the canton of Zurich also backs the power dilution hypothesis, showing that a larger share of foreigners reduces support for a regime change.
Subjects: 
non-citizen voting rights
opting-in
power sharing
democratization
JEL: 
D72
D78
J15
K16
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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