Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/240388 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BOFIT Discussion Papers No. 10/2021
Verlag: 
Bank of Finland, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
We first present a simple model of post-crisis policymaking driven by both public and private interests. Using a novel dataset covering 94 countries between 1973 and 2015, we then establish that financial crises can lead to government interventions in financial markets. Consistent with a public interest channel, we find post-crisis interventions occur only in democratic countries. However, by using a plausibly exogenous setting -i.e., term limits- muting political accountability, we show that democratic leaders who do not have re-election concerns are substantially more likely to intervene in financial markets after crises, in ways that may promote (obstruct) private (public) interests.
Schlagwörter: 
Financial crises
reform reversals
democracies
term-limits
special-interest groups
JEL: 
G01
G28
P11
P16
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
ISBN: 
978-952-323-382-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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