Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/239745 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Administrative Sciences [ISSN:] 2076-3387 [Volume:] 5 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2015 [Pages:] 2-26
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We develop a game theoretic model to analyze the Nash equilibrium of vaccine decisions in a hospital population with heterogeneous contacts. We use the model in conjunction with person-to-person contact data within a large university hospital. We simulate, using agent-based models, the probability of infection for various worker types in the data and use these probabilities to identify the Nash equilibrium vaccine choices of hospital workers. The analysis suggests that there may be large differences in vaccination rates among hospital worker groups. We extend the model to include peer effects within the game. The peer effects may create additional equilibria or may further cement existing equilibria depending on parameter values. Further, depending on the magnitude of the peer effects and the costs of infection and vaccination, peer effects may increase or decrease differences in worker group vaccination rates within the hospital.
Subjects: 
vaccination game
computational epidemiology
economic epidemiology
social networks
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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