Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/239531 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Risk and Financial Management [ISSN:] 1911-8074 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2021 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In the beginning of the second book of his Politeia (Republic) Plato in passage 2.358e-359a-c raises the issue of the administration of justice as a means of motivating people to behave fairly regarding their relationships and when cooperating with each other because, at the end, this is mutually beneficial for all of them. We argue that this particular passage could be seen as a part of a wider process of evolution and development of the institutions of the ancient Athenian economy during the Classical period (508-322 BCE) and could be interpreted through modern theoretical concepts, and more particularly, game theory. Plato argued that there are two players, each with two identical strategies, to treat the other justly or unjustly. In the beginning, each player chooses the 'unjust' strategy, trying to cheat the other. In this context, which could be seen as a prisoner's dilemma situation, both end with the worst possible outcome, that is, deceiving each other and this has severe financial consequences for both of them. Realizing this, in a repeated game situation, with increasing information on the outcome and on each other, they choose the "just" strategy so achieving the best outcome and transforming the game in a cooperative one. We analyze this, formulating a dynamic game which is related to international commercial transactions, after explaining how such a situation could really arise in Classical Athens. We argue that this is the optimal scenario for both parties because it minimizes the risk of deceiving each other and creates harmony while performing financial transactions.
Subjects: 
international trade
commercial transactions
fairness
game theory
Plato
JEL: 
B11
C71
C73
D81
F33
K20
N23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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