Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835 
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dc.contributor.authorVoigtländer, Michaelen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30T12:03:43Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-30T12:03:43Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23835-
dc.description.abstractIn the present paper the effects of different pay-as-you-go pension systems on fertility decisions of a representative household are examined. Thereby, the analysis focuses especially on the interplay of parental quantity and quality decisions, introduced by Becker (1960). As it will be shown, a traditional pay-as-you-go system in either case distorts decisions of parents leading to an erosion of the financial basis of the system. In contrast, the assessment of a child-related pay-as-you-go system is ambiguous. If parents are solely responsible for expenditures on the quality of children, it is inefficient, too. However, if it is combined with a device like public education, optimality can be restored.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aOtto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung (owiwo) |cKölnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aOtto-Wolff-Discussion Paper |x2004,02en
dc.subject.jelD10en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.jelI20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPay-as-you-goen
dc.subject.keywordchild-related pensionen
dc.subject.keywordquantity and quality of childrenen
dc.subject.stwGesetzliche Rentenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwUmlageverfahrenen
dc.subject.stwFamilienleistungsausgleichen
dc.subject.stwBildungsinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwBildungspolitiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA Perfect Marriage: Child-related Pensions and Public Education-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn49523933Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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