Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/23820 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2007
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 250
Verlag: 
European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics, Frankfurt (Oder)
Zusammenfassung: 
If a previously unpaid activity (donating blood) is paid then we often observe that this activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesised that the price offered is taken as a proxy for the "market value" of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in, as well as persistence (or not) of the effect after the abandoning of payment is implied. This "naive" explanation is confronted with Bénabou and Tirole´s (2003) priciple-agent model where the opposite signalling effect is hypothesised: a higher price is taken as an indication for a lower value.
Schlagwörter: 
Intrinsic Motivation
Crowding-out
Signaling
JEL: 
H42
D64
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
105.89 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.