Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23820
Authors: 
Bolle, Friedel
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 250
Abstract: 
If a previously unpaid activity (donating blood) is paid then we often observe that this activity is reduced. In this paper, it is hypothesised that the price offered is taken as a proxy for the "market value" of the activity. Depending on how the actor valued the activity previously, crowding-out or crowding-in, as well as persistence (or not) of the effect after the abandoning of payment is implied. This "naive" explanation is confronted with Bénabou and Tirole´s (2003) priciple-agent model where the opposite signalling effect is hypothesised: a higher price is taken as an indication for a lower value.
Subjects: 
Intrinsic Motivation
Crowding-out
Signaling
JEL: 
H42
D64
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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