Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23796
Authors: 
Vogel, Claudia
Heimel, Jana
Bolle, Friedel
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
Diskussionspapiere / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 223
Abstract: 
In the Solidarity Game (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998), two "rich" persons can support a "poor" one. A strong positive correlation between one rich person's solidarity contribution and his expected contribution of the other is observed. This paper investigates the causality behind this correlation. Depending on the measure, we find that up to thirds of our subjects behave strategically. More than one third of the subjects show a crowding-out effect, i.e. they want to give less if they expect others to give more. This is no contradiction to the positive correlation if these subjects assume the others to be like themselves. In addition to strategic motives we find, for a quarter of the subjects, the wish to imitate their co-benefactors, usually however only for low contributions.
Subjects: 
Solidarity
Crowding out
Imitation
JEL: 
D64
C72
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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