Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237799 
Editors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
How do interacting decision-makers make strategic choices? If they're rational and can somehow predict each other's behavior, they may find themselves in a Nash equilibrium. However, humans display pervasive and systematic departures from rationality. They oft􀀵en do not conform to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium, or its various refinements. This has led to the growth of behavioral game theory, which accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social preferences, bounded rationality (for example, limited iterated reasoning), and learning from experience. This book brings together new advances in the field of behavioral game theory that help us understand how people actually make strategic decisions in game theoretic situations.
Subjects: 
bounded rationality
cognitive hierarchy theory
dual accumulator model
level-k reasoning
limited iterated reasoning
noisy introspection
payoff sensitivity
psychological game theory
quantal response equilibrium
salience
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-3-03943-774-0
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Book
Document Version: 
Published Version
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