Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237708 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECB Working Paper No. 2569
Publisher: 
European Central Bank (ECB), Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
Whether Federal Reserve Bank presidents have the right to vote on the U.S. monetary policy committee depends on a mechanical, yearly rotation scheme. Rotation is without exclusion: also nonvoting presidents attend and participate in the meetings of the committee. Does voting status change behavior? We find that the data go against the hypothesis that without the voting right, presidents use their public speeches and their meeting interventions to compensate for the loss of formal influence; rather, they support the hypothesis that the voting right makes presidents more involved. We also find that speeches move financial markets less in years that presidents vote. We argue that these discounts are consistent with their communication behavior.
Subjects: 
voting right rotation
monetary policy committee
central bank communication
FOMC
financial market response
JEL: 
D71
D72
E58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
ISBN: 
978-92-899-4755-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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