Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237584 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
UCD Centre for Economic Research Working Paper Series No. WP21/06
Verlag: 
University College Dublin, UCD Centre for Economic Research, Dublin
Zusammenfassung: 
Recent experimental evidence suggests that donors are averse to giving to charities with high overhead ratios. This paper asks whether donors are also averse to giving to charities spending a high share of the donations on unavoidable administrative expenses. The results of an experiment with a nationally representative sample (n = 1, 032) suggest that donors dislike paying for administrative burden almost as much as for overhead. While donors care primarily about how much of their donations are used for program-related services, donors seem to have a weak preference for charities to spend their donations on administrative burden rather than on overheads. Government subsidies that help alleviate charities' administrative burden can reduce donors' aversion to give to charities with high administrative expenses. Overall, we show that regulations that aim to increase transparency and accountability in the charity sector can have the unintended side effect of reducing charitable giving.
Schlagwörter: 
charitable giving
administrative burden
overhead aversion
information
dictator game
online experiment
JEL: 
C99
D64
L31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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