Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/237316 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ECONtribute Discussion Paper No. 071
Publisher: 
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI), Bonn and Cologne
Abstract: 
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized.
Subjects: 
Political competition
Income Taxation
Turnout
JEL: 
D72
D82
H21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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