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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 358
Versionsangabe: 
This version: June 2021
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a theory of strategic innovation project choice by incumbents and start-ups which serves as a foundation for the analysis of acquisition policy. We show that prohibiting acquisitions has a weakly negative innovation effect. We provide conditions determining the size of the effect and, in particular, whether it is zero or positive. We further analyze the effects of less restrictive policies, including merger remedies and the tax treatment of acquisitions and initial public offerings. Such interventions tend to prevent acquisitions only if the entrant has sufficiently high stand-alone profits.
Schlagwörter: 
innovation
killer acquisitions
merger policy
potential competition
start-ups
JEL: 
O31
L41
G34
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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