Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2355
Authors: 
Bickenbach, Frank
Kumkar, Lars
Soltwedel, Rüdiger
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper 961
Abstract: 
Hybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the economics of complex vertical and horizontal coordination problems. It sketches the specific view of NIE at industrial organization, antitrust and regulation, discusses three current issues – the European policy concerning complex vertical contracts, regulatory reform of the electricity industry and the allocation of regulatory competencies in the EU – and presents some implications of NIE for economic policy making, research and advisory activities.
Subjects: 
New institutional economics
antitrust
regulation
incomplete contracts
regulatory reform
economic models of federalism
JEL: 
L51
L43
L42
L22
K23
D23
D72
H11
K21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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