Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23533
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dc.contributor.authorBuehler, Stefanen_US
dc.contributor.authorHaucap, Justusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:27:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:27:08Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-1486-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23533-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes a sequential game where firms decide about outsourcingthe production of a non-specific input good to an imperfectly competitive inputmarket. We apply the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenbergand Tirole (1984) to characterize the different equilibria. We find that outsourcing generally softens competition in the final product market. If firms anticipate the impact of their outsourcing decisions on input prices, there may be equilibria where firms outsource so as to collude or to raise rivals? costs. We illustrate our analysis using a linear Cournot model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionspapier / Helmut-Schmidt-Universität Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre |x15en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL24en_US
dc.subject.jelL23en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwOutsourcingen_US
dc.subject.stwDuopolen_US
dc.subject.stwUnvollkommener Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleStrategic Outsourcing Revisiteden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn369947185en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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