Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235314 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8944
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
Tipping of a natural system, entailing a loss of ecosystem services, may be prevented by stable partial cooperation. The presence of tipping points reverses the grim story that a high level of cooperation is hard to achieve and leaves large possible gains of cooperation. We investigate a tipping game with constant emissions and a piecewise linear response, and the well-known lake system with concave-convex dynamics and time-dependent emissions. Tipping back, leading to a gain in services, can also be induced by stable partial cooperation, but is harder to achieve. A physically reversible natural system may prove to be socially irreversible.
Subjects: 
tipping points
multiple Nash equilibria
stable partial cooperation
ecological systems
JEL: 
C70
Q20
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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