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Autoren: 
Dewenter, Ralf
Haucap, Justus
Datum: 
2003
Reihe/Nr.: 
Diskussionspapier 23
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines mobile termination fees and their regulation when networks are asymmetric in size. It is demonstrated that with consumer ignorance about the exact termination rates (a) a mobile network's termination rate is the higher the smaller the network's size (as measured through its subscriber base) and (b) asymmetric regulation of only the larger operators in a market will, ce-teris paribus, induce the smaller operators to increase their termination rates. The results are supported by empirical evidence using data on mobile termination rates from 48 European mobile operators from 2001 to 2003.
Schlagwörter: 
mobile termination
telecommunications
consumer ignorance
price regulation
JEL: 
L96
L51
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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