Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235115 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 03
Verlag: 
Bocconi University, Centre for Research on Geography, Resources, Environment, Energy and Networks (GREEN), Milan
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper studies competition for the market in a setting where incumbents (and, to a lesser extent, neighboring incumbents) benefit from a cost advantage. The paper first compares the outcome of staggered and synchronous tenders, before drawing the implications for market design. We find that the timing of tenders should depend on the likelihood of monopolization. When monopolization is expected, synchronous tendering is preferable, as it strengthens the pressure that entrants exercise on the monopolist. When instead other firms remain active, staggered tendering is preferable, as it maximizes the competitive pressure that comes from the other firms.
Schlagwörter: 
Dynamic procurement
incumbency advantage
localmonopoly
competition
asymmetric auctions
synchronous contracts
staggered contracts
JEL: 
D44
D47
H40
H57
L43
L51
R48
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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