Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/235022 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
AWI Discussion Paper Series No. 699
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
In a simplifying analytical framework with endogenous levels of actual and self-reported emissions, we consolidate the existing literature into three main hypotheses about the relative merits, for a resource-constrained regulator, of random (RAM) and competitive (CAM) audit mechanisms in the presence or absence of peer information about actual emissions. Testing the three hypotheses in a quasi-laboratory experiment (N = 131), we find supportive evidence that CAM always induce more truthful reporting than RAM. Moreover, we provide the empirical validation of the theoretical prediction that CAM can succeed in aligning actual emissions more closely with the social optimum in the presence of peer information when RAM cannot. Behavioral mechanisms prevent reaching the first-best outcome.
Schlagwörter: 
environmental regulation
regulatory compliance
tournament theory
mechanism design
Laboratory experiment
JEL: 
D62
H41
H83
L51
Q58
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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