Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23501
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dc.contributor.authorWinston, Gordon C.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:09:38Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:09:38Z-
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23501-
dc.description.abstractThe market for undergraduate education has many similarities to an arms race. A school?sposition – relative to other schools – determines its success in attracting students and studentquality. Its position, in turn, is largely determined by the size of its student subsidies, thedifference between its educational spending and the net tuition it charges its students (or, muchthe same thing, how much their students have to pay for a dollar?s worth of educationalspending). High-subsidy schools spend the most per dollar of tuition so that ?bargain? attractsthe highest quality students. To change its position, a school must spend more or charge less – and find the resources to support it. The positional arms race suggests why competition from aschool further down in the hierarchy forces a response more effectively than competition fromabove and why it?s been typical of higher education that costs rise to reposition, but prices don?tfall.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWPEHE discussion paper series / Williams College, Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education |x54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwStudiumen_US
dc.subject.stwSubventionen_US
dc.subject.stwStudienfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleThe positional arms race in higher educationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn366097334en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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