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|dc.contributor.author||Winston, Gordon C.||en_US|
|dc.description.abstract||The market for undergraduate education has many similarities to an arms race. A school?sposition – relative to other schools – determines its success in attracting students and studentquality. Its position, in turn, is largely determined by the size of its student subsidies, thedifference between its educational spending and the net tuition it charges its students (or, muchthe same thing, how much their students have to pay for a dollar?s worth of educationalspending). High-subsidy schools spend the most per dollar of tuition so that ?bargain? attractsthe highest quality students. To change its position, a school must spend more or charge less – and find the resources to support it. The positional arms race suggests why competition from aschool further down in the hierarchy forces a response more effectively than competition fromabove and why it?s been typical of higher education that costs rise to reposition, but prices don?tfall.||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries|||aWPEHE discussion paper series / Williams College, Williams Project on the Economics of Higher Education |x54||en_US|
|dc.title||The positional arms race in higher education||en_US|
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