Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234934 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1122
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider exclusive contracts as a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, owing to the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.
Schlagwörter: 
Multinational firms
Exclusive dealing
Vertical relation
Market protection
JEL: 
F21
F23
L12
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
210.68 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.