Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234928
Authors: 
Zhou, Yu
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1116
Abstract: 
In multi-object auction models with unitary demand agents, if agents’ utility functions satisfy quasi-linearity, three auction formats, sealed-bid auction, exact ascending auction, and approximate ascending auction, are known to identify the minimum price equilibrium (MPE), and exhibit elegant efficiency and incentive-compatibility. These auctions are conjured to preserve their properties beyond quasi-linearity. Nevertheless, we exemplify that with general utility functions, these auctions fail to identify the MPEs and are substantially inefficient and manipulatable. The implications of our negative results for multi-object auction models with agents with multi-unit demand, and matching with contracts models are also discussed.
Subjects: 
Multi-object auction
minimum price equilibrium
examples
quasi-linear utility functions
general utility functions
JEL: 
C78
D44
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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