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dc.contributor.authorNyman, John A.en
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:08:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:08:53Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23491-
dc.description.abstractConventional theory holds that moral hazard - the additional health care purchased as a result of becoming insured - is an opportunistic price response and is welfare-decreasing because the value of the additional health care purchased is less than its costs. The theory of the demand for health insurance presented here suggests that moral hazard is primarily an income transfer effect. In an estimation based on parameters from the literature, the value of moral hazard consumption is found to be 3 times greater than its costs, suggesting that income transfer effects dominate price effects and that moral hazard is welfare-increasing.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Minnesota, Center for Economic Research |cMinneapolis, MNen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x311en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordhealth insuranceen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordincome transfer effecten
dc.subject.stwKrankenversicherungen
dc.subject.stwKonsumtheorieen
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwGesundheitsökonomiken
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleThe Theory of the Demand for Health Insurance-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn372041507en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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