Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23491
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dc.contributor.authorNyman, John A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:08:53Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:08:53Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23491-
dc.description.abstractConventional theory holds that moral hazard -- the additional health care purchased as aresult of becoming insured -- is an opportunistic price response and is welfare-decreasing becausethe value of the additional health care purchased is less than its costs. The theory of the demandfor health insurance presented here suggests that moral hazard is primarily an income transfereffect. In an estimation based on parameters from the literature, the value of moral hazardconsumption is found to be 3 times greater than its costs, suggesting that income transfer effectsdominate price effects and that moral hazard is welfare-increasing.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMinnesota working papers / University of Minnesota, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics |x311en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordhealth insuranceen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden_US
dc.subject.keywordincome transfer effecten_US
dc.subject.stwKrankenversicherungen_US
dc.subject.stwKonsumtheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwVersicherungsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwGesundheitsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleThe Theory of the Demand for Health Insuranceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn372041507en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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