Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234919
Authors: 
Sakai, Ryosuke
Serizawa, Shigehiro
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 1107
Abstract: 
We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, non-waste fulness, equal treatment of equals, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Kazumura et al. (2020B), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is the unique ex-post revenue maximizing rule among the rules satisfying no subsidy in addition to the four properties, and that no subsidy in this result can be replaced by no bankruptcy on the positive income effect domain.
Subjects: 
Multi-object allocation problem
Strategy-proofness
Ex-post revenue maximization
Minimum price Walrasian rule
Non-quasi-linear preference
Equal treatment of equals
Non-waste fulness
JEL: 
D82
D47
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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