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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 48-2020
Verlag: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Zusammenfassung: 
The decision-making process in the ECB's Governing Council remains opaque as the ECB, in contrast to many other central banks, does not publish the votes for or against a policy proposal. In this paper, we construct an index of dissent based on the ECB presidents' answers to journalists' questions during the press conference following each meeting. This narrative account of dissent suggests that dissenting votes are cast frequently. We show that the non-forecastable component of dissent weakens the response of long-term interest rates to policy surprises and thus affects the monetary transmission mechanism. The yield response is significantly stronger under unanimity compared to dissent. This finding is robust to several alternative specifications.
Schlagwörter: 
event studies
monetary policy transmission
monetary policy committee
disagreement
term structure
JEL: 
E42
E43
E58
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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