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Autoren: 
Khachatryan, Elina
Bühren, Christoph
Datum: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 39-2020
Zusammenfassung: 
Aggression is displaced when provocations cannot be directly retaliated against and when it is redirected towards a target innocent of any wrongdoing. While this phenomenon is widespread, it has not been widely explored in experimental economics. We fill this gap and find that a sizeable proportion of subjects (37%), when treated unfairly, punish co-players who are not at all responsible for the unfairness. When in a disadvantaged position, inequity-aversion seems to be the driving force of punishment, yet when treated fairly, some subjects (17%) exhibit status-seeking behavior. Moreover, students affiliated with an armed forces university are much more likely than regular students to engage in displaced aggression.
Schlagwörter: 
Displaced Aggression
Punishment
Soldiers
Dictator Game
Experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
D63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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