Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234843 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics No. 38-2020
Publisher: 
Philipps-University Marburg, School of Business and Economics, Marburg
Abstract: 
We experimentally analyzed whether (anti-)herding behavior of forecasters in sport-betting markets is influenced by the incentive structure of the market (winner-takes-all vs. equal payment of most accurate forecasts) and by personal traits of forecasters. We found evidence of anti-herding in forecasts of the German Bundesliga. Self-reported knowledge and, more surprisingly, winner-takes-all incentives reduced anti-herding. On average, forecasts were less accurate with stronger anti-herding. Winner-takes-all incentives and self-reported knowledge improved forecasts.
Subjects: 
(Anti-)Herding
Sports forecasting
Experiment
Survey data
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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