Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23467
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dc.contributor.authorSpiegel, Yossien_US
dc.contributor.authorGilo, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:07:46Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:07:46Z-
dc.date.issued2003en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23467-
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how competing firms can facilitate tacit collusion by making passiveinvestments in rivals. In general, the incentives of firms to collude depend in a complexway on the whole set of partial cross ownership (PCO) in the industry. We show thatwhen firms are identical, only multilateral PCO may (but need not) facilitate tacitcollusion. A firm?s controller can facilitate tacit collusion further by investing directly inrival firms and by diluting his stake in his own firm. In the presence of costasymmetries, even unilateral PCO by efficient firms in a less efficient rival can facilitatetacit collusion.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisheren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCSIO working paper / Northwestern University, Center for the Study of Industrial Organization |x0038en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpartial cross ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated Bertrand oligopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcontrolling shareholderen_US
dc.subject.keywordcost asymmetriesen_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalbeteiligungen_US
dc.subject.stwEigent├╝merstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.titlePartial cross ownership and tacit collusionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn394159268en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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