Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234646 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-989
Verlag: 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Washington, DC
Zusammenfassung: 
Limited borrower information may create targeting distortions in credit markets. Community-based lending programs may reduce these distortions by exploiting information transmitted in local networks, but connections may create asymmetries in power. This paper analyzes how local leaders balance issues of neediness, productivity (TFP), risk, and favoritism to allocate subsidized loans to Thai villagers. Local leaders provided credit to richer, less-productive and elite-connected villagers. These connection-based distortions threatened the program's sustainability. Moreover, eliminating these distortions would increase village-level output by 1.5%. Finally, informal markets partially attenuated the targeting distortions by redirecting credit to unconnected households, albeit at high interest rates.
Schlagwörter: 
Decentralization
Entrepreneurship
Targeting
Microfinance
JEL: 
D14
G21
O12
O16
O17
L14
Z13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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