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dc.contributor.authorBénabou, Rolanden
dc.contributor.authorTirole, Jeanen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T16:07:16Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T16:07:16Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/23457-
dc.description.abstractWe build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this 'overjustification effect' can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.en
dc.language.isogeren
dc.publisher|aPrinceton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs |cPrinceton, NJen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Papers in Economics |x230en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.jelZ13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen
dc.subject.keywordrewardsen
dc.subject.keywordmotivationen
dc.subject.keywordoverjustification effecten
dc.subject.keywordcrowding outen
dc.subject.keywordidentityen
dc.subject.keywordsocial norms.en
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwPrestigeen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Normen
dc.titleIncentives and Prosocial Behavior-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn504016350en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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