Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/234564 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 385
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.
Schlagwörter: 
Walrasian equilibrium
pseudomarkets
market design
revelation principle
welfare theorems
equilibrium existence
discrete markets
complementarities
constraints
JEL: 
D47
D50
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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