Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/23413
Autoren: 
Bannier, Christina E.
Datum: 
2005
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series: Finance & Accounting 148
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies optimal risk-taking and information disclosure by firms that obtain financing from both a ?relationship? bank and ?arm?s-length? banks. We find that firm decisions are asymmetrically influenced by the degree of heterogeneity among banks: lowly-collateralized firms vary optimal risk and information precision along with the degree of relationship lending for projects with low expected cash-flows, while highly-collateralized firms do so for projects with high expected cash-flows. Incidences of inefficient project liquidation are minimized if the former firms rely on relationship banking to a low degree, the latter to a large degree.
Schlagwörter: 
Risk
Relationship Lending
Asymmetric Information
Liquidity Crisis
Efficiency
JEL: 
D82
L14
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
269.82 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.