Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/234046
Authors: 
Khadjavi, Menusch
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Law and Economics [ISSN:] 0929-1261 [Volume:] 46 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 165-178
Abstract: 
Criminal law and economics rests on the expectation that deterrence incentives can be employed to reduce crime. Prison survey evidence however suggests that a majority of criminals are biased and may not react to deterrence incentives. This study employs an extra-laboratory experiment with criminals in a German prison to test the effectiveness of deterrence and compares it with data of student subjects. Subjects either face potential punishment when stealing, or they can steal without deterrence. We confirm Gary Becker’s deterrence hypothesis that deterrence works for criminals (and similarly for students). We observe significantly more risk-seeking criminals than students, although the vast majority (80.77%) of criminals behaves risk-neutral or risk-averse.
Subjects: 
crime
stealing
deterrence
prison
inmates
risk
extra-laboratory experiment
artefactual field experiment
JEL: 
C72
C91
C93
K42
Published Version’s DOI: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/de/
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.