Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233688 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics [ISSN:] 1467-8292 [Volume:] 93 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 177-203
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
Trade unions distort a profit-maximizing firm's input choice. The nature of the resulting inefficiency depends on whether there are wage negotiations or there is efficient bargaining. Moreover, trade unions redistribute income and thereby affect welfare. If firms also pursue Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) objectives, input choices may be distorted already in the absence of collective bargaining. Adopting a positive perspective, we show that CSR objectives, which induce a firm to expand production, have ambiguous wage and employment consequences in case of wage negotiations and raise employment if there is efficient bargaining. Importantly from a normative vantage point, such CSR objectives make a welfare-enhancing role of trade unions more likely in the presence of wage negotiations. The reverse is true in case of efficient bargaining.
Subjects: 
corporate social responsibility
efficient bargaining
trade unions
wage bargaining
welfare
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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