Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233523 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EconPol Policy Brief No. 33
Verlag: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Delays in the availability of vaccines are costly as the pandemic continues. However, in the presence of adjustment costs firms have an incentive to increase production capacity only gradually. The existing contracts specify only a fixed quantity to be supplied over a certain period and thus provide no incentive for an accelerated buildup in capacity. A high price does not change this. The optimal contract would specify a decreasing price schedule over time which can replicate the social optimum.
Dokumentart: 
Research Report

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