Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233502 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 279
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
Our study compares individual and team bidding in standard auction formats: first-price, second-price and ascending-price (English) auctions with independent private values. In a laboratory experiment, we find that individuals overbid more than teams in first-price auctions and deviate more from bidding their own value in second-price auctions. However we observe no difference in bidding behavior in English auctions. Based on control variables, we claim that the observed difference can be explained by better reasoning abilities of teams. Emotions play a role in determining bids, but the effect of emotions on bidding does not differ between individuals and teams.
Subjects: 
auctions
team decision-making
experiment
overbidding
JEL: 
C91
C92
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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