Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233490 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 266
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
Weitzman (2014) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform carbon price is more effective than Paris style negotiations in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results show that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price yields significantly higher emissions reductions, more participation, and more equal contributions than individual commitments to a non-binding common goal à la Paris.
Schlagwörter: 
Climate Negotiations
Negotiation Design
Model United Nations
Uniform Carbon Price
JEL: 
C81
C93
F51
H87
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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