Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233358 
Year of Publication: 
2021
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 143
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We evaluate the causes and consequences of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In Finland, local elections use a proportional representation system with open lists, and parties may form joint lists. We document that PECs are more common between parties of equal size and similar ideology, and when elections are more disproportional or involve more parties. Using both difference-in-differences and density discontinuity designs we document that voters punish coalescing parties, especially if they are ideologically diverse, and also respond to PECs by targeting personal votes strategically within the PECs. Moreover, small parties become more likely to acquire political leadership positions. Finally, PECs seem to be formed also with the particular purpose of influencing the overall distribution of political power: they lead to more dispersed seat distributions and prevent absolute majorities in close elections. Thus, voter ideology and electoral rules create natural boundaries for the parties, but the party formateurs also consider wider impacts.
Subjects: 
bargaining power
local elections
multi - party systems
open - list PR system
pre - electoral coalitions
strategic voting
JEL: 
C23
D23
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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