Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233356 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2021
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion paper No. 141
Verlag: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Zusammenfassung: 
Choice behavior is rational if it is based on the maximization of some context-independent preference relation. This study re-examines the questions of implementation theory in a setting where players’ choice behavior need not be rational and coalition formation must be taken into account. Our model implies that with boundedly rational players, the formation of groups greatly affects the design exercise. As a by-product, we also propose a notion of behavioral efficiency and we compare it with existing notions.
Schlagwörter: 
Strong equilibrium
implementation
state-contingent choice rules
bounded rationality
JEL: 
D11
D60
D83
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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