Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233324 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 109
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
We study iterated formation of mutually best matches (IMB) in college admissions problems. When IMB produces a maximal individually rational matching, the matching has many good properties like Pareto optimality and stability. If preferences satisfy a single peakedness condition, or have a single crossing property, then IMB produces a maximal individually rational matching. These properties guarantee also that the student proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Top Trading Cycles algorithm (TTC) produce the same matching as IMB. We compare these results with some well-known results about when DA is Pareto optimal, or when DA and TTC produce the same matching.
Subjects: 
Matching
School choice
College admission
JEL: 
C70
C71
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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