Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233222 
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper No. 6
Publisher: 
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), Turku
Abstract: 
The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament. Empirical analysis suggests that the Council is, in fact, significantly more conservative than Parliament and Commission; the latter two are significantly closer to each other than Council and Commission.
Subjects: 
European Commission
investiture procedure
voting rules
Council of Ministers
European Parliament
JEL: 
C70
D71
H77
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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